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Recovery of “Intrinsic Value”
Damages in Case of Negligently
Killed Pet Dog
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T
he North Carolina Court
of Appeals, in a case
where negligent killing of
a pet dog with no market
value was admitted, has denied recovery of “intrinsic”
damages (also called “actual” damages). Shera v. NC
State University Veterinary Teaching Hospital, 723 S.E.2d
352 (N.C. App. 2012). Because the holding is narrow





The Veterinary Hospital Admits
Negligence; Minimal Damages are
Awarded
Laci, a Jack Russell Terrier owned by Mr.
and Mrs. Shera, began to be treated for liver
cancer at the defendant state veterinary hospi-
tal in 2003. After treatment, the cancer was in
remission, but Laci had quarterly checkups at
the hospital. In 2007 Laci began experiencing
problems with poor appetite, vomiting, and
difficulty with urination, and Plaintiffs
returned the dog to the hospital for treatment.
She was admitted on March 31.
Following days of tests, Defendant deter-
mined that Laci should have an intranasal
feeding tube, which on April 5 was inserted by
the hospital staff. Laci was transferred to the
intensive care unit. Unknown to anyone at the
time, the feeding tube was placed into Laci’s
lungs rather than her stomach, and she began
drowning due to the material forced into her
lungs. The next day her heart stopped beating,
and she could not be resuscitated. Not know-
ing the cause of their pet’s death, Plaintiffs paid
the hospital’s veterinary bill in full. Three days
later, Defendant advised them that the mis-
placed feeding tube had caused Laci’s death.
In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a veterinary mal-
practice action against the hospital with the
North Carolina Industrial Commission pur-
suant to the state’s Tort Claims Act, seeking
damages based on the “intrinsic” value of Laci
to them and citing the 1988 decision in
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Freeman, Inc. v. Alderman Photo Co.1
Defendant’s answer admitted negligence and
requested a hearing on the issue of damages.
The initial hearing officer awarded Plaintiffs
only $2,755.72, the amount the pet owners
had paid the hospital for treatment billed
from March 31 through April 6, 2007.
Reviewing this award, the full commission
increased the damages by $350, which it
found to be the cost of replacing Laci with
another Jack Russell. The commission
employed the replacement value measure of
damages upon finding that the aged Laci had
no fair market value. The commission noted
that North Carolina courts have recognized
intrinsic value as a category of damages that is
appropriate in some circumstances, but
declined to expand applicability of that meas-
ure of damages to cases involving injury to or
death of companion animals.
The Court of Appeals Affirms Based on
Insufficient Evidence
The court of appeals affirmed, initially
holding that replacement value is properly
employed to assess damages where damaged
property had no market value (citing cases
involving a damaged power pole and trans-
former and a stolen pay telephone). The court
did note that in the Freeman case—where the
defendant’s negligence resulted in the destruc-
tion of “hundreds of architectural drawings,
work papers, and surveys”2 that had no mar-
ket value—recovery of damages based on
intrinsic or actual value to the plaintiff of the
lost property was approved.3 In Freeman the
jury had been instructed that one factor to
consider in determining intrinsic or actual
value was “the uniqueness of that [destroyed]
property.”4 The evidence in Freeman estab-
lished that some, although not many, of the
lost drawings—which were unique—could be
reused if recreated. On the other hand, exam-
ination of the evidence in the Shera case led
the court of appeals to conclude, in essence,
that Laci was not a unique pet. In sum, the
plaintiffs could not get the benefit of Freeman
because of a failure of proof.
The inadequate evidence included testi-
mony that Laci “brought so much joy” to the
Shera home and “brought so much comfort”
to Mr. Shera, who suffered from a heart con-
dition; and that Laci “was just very helpful in
stressful situations.”5 The court of appeals
acknowledged that Mrs. Shera testified that
“Laci was unique. She had her own personal-
ity.”6 But apparently this was viewed as too
conclusory to support an award of damages
based on intrinsic value. Said the court: “The
testimony reveals no absolute unique tasks or
functions that Laci performed for plaintiffs,
aside from her calming presence....”7
Plaintiffs also argued that the large sums of
money they had spent treating Laci for cancer
proved that Laci had an intrinsic value or actu-
al value to them in excess of replacement
value.
The court of appeals rejected the argu-
ment, stating: “[P]laintiffs fail to adequately
explain how amounts spent on the dog’s care
prior to 31 March 2007, when Laci was
admitted to defendant’s care and negligently
killed, were proximately related in any way to
defendant’s negligent act on 6 April 2007 and
plaintiffs’ resulting injury.”8 While this state-
ment does not address the point made by
Plaintiffs, it would seem to establish that, for
some reason, amounts spent on health care for
a pet are not relevant when intrinsic damages
are sought. 
“The sentimental bond between a human
and his or her pet companion,” the Shera
court concluded, “can neither be quantified in
monetary terms or compensated for under
our current law.... [H]ow to value the loss of
the human-animal bond between a pet owner
and his or her companion animal...is more
appropriately addressed to our legislature.”9
Unfortunate Dictum for Pro-Animal
Advocates
While the narrow holding of Shera is that
the plaintiffs failed to prove any intrinsic value
to them of their dog, apparent dictum in the
case renders Freeman (the architectural draw-
ings case) and its intrinsic value theory of
damages essentially worthless in future litiga-
tion concerning death of or injury to a pet.
Shera read Freeman as employing the intrinsic
value measure of damages “rather than the
property’s replacement value,” which it
inferred would be greater.10 “Thus, the ‘actual
value’ instruction in Freeman was applied to
limit, rather than enhance, the plaintiff ’s
recovery....”11 Intrinsic value “damage
awards,” said the Shera court,
have proven to be the rare exception and
have never been applied to either enhance
a damages award or to the recovery of dam-
ages for the loss of companion animals.
This is surely due in part to the fact that a
multitude of companion animals are avail-
able in society, and...replacement of the
type of property—a companion animal—
currently is possible under our law.12
This seems to tell pet owners as future litigants
that they should just prove replacement value
in the absence of market value, as the Freeman
case and its theory of intrinsic value will not
entitle them to recover anything more. A
highly trained service dog will have intrinsic
value, but will also have a market value, a fact
that will preclude resort to the intrinsic value
theory of damages.
The Shera Decision has No Effect on
Future Claims for Emotional Damages
The actual holding in Shera leaves wide
open the question whether in North Carolina
emotional damages may be recovered for the
tortiously-caused injury or death of a pet that
was treated by its owners as a member of the
family. That is so because the plaintiffs in
Shera rested their claim to intrinsic value dam-
ages on the Freeman case where the property
damaged—architectural drawings—was non-
sentient personal property, and where the
court specifically held that intrinsic value
damages did not include “purely emotional
value” that the property may have had.13
The court of appeal in Shera stated: “The
current law in North Carolina is clear that the
market value measure of damages applies in
cases involving the negligent destruction of
personal property, whether sentient or not.”14
Since the plaintiffs in Shera had not argued
that a special rule of damages—that permitted
recovery of emotional damages—applied
where the property negligently destroyed was
a sentient pet, the quoted statement is at best
dictum. It is also wrong. It cannot be “clear”
that North Carolina law bars recovery of emo-
tional damages where a pet has been negli-
gently killed (or injured) because the issue has
not been before the courts of the state in a
reported decision. On the other hand, as dis-
cussed previously in this journal,15 a 1913
decision of the North Carolina Supreme
Court can readily be construed as establishing
the right by a plaintiff-owner to recover emo-
tional damages for the willful killing of a pet
dog in the plaintiff ’s presence.16 This older
decision could lead North Carolina courts to
follow the precedents of Florida, where emo-
tional damages are recoverable for the willful
or grossly negligent killing or injury of a pet,
but not if the level of fault by the tortfeasor is
ordinary negligence.17 In other states there is
a trend to allowing emotional damages to be
awarded where a pet has been injured or killed
willfully.18 Such decisions recognize pets as a
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special type of personal property subject to
unique rules concerning recovery of damages.
The Hospital had Grounds to Appeal
the Award of Economic Damages
Because the veterinary hospital in Shera
did not appeal, the decision there is not prece-
dent supporting the amount of economic
damages awarded to the pet owners by the
commission panel. The $350 replacement
value surely was based on the cost of buying a
young Jack Russell Terrier, but Laci was a sick-
ly 12 3/4-year-old dog.19 Should not her age
and health status have guided the determina-
tion of replacement value? 
In addition, the veterinary hospital could
have objected on appeal to being ordered by
the commission to refund all of the veterinary
bills paid by a pet owner after the hospital
conceded there had been veterinary malprac-
tice. Much of the $2,755.72 that the pet own-
ers had paid the hospital related to veterinary
care during the period March 31 through
April 4, which involved no malpractice.
Should the improper placement of the feeding
tube on April 5 have tainted the non-objec-
tionable veterinary services rendered prior to
that negligent act?20
Must a Non-Veterinarian Tortfeasor
Who Injures a Pet Reimburse for
Reasonable Veterinary Bills that Exceed
the Market or Replacement Value of
the Animal?
Even if North Carolina courts establish a
precedent that a veterinarian guilty of mal-
practice that injures or kills a pet cannot retain
sums paid by the pet’s owners for treatment,
such a development would not necessarily dic-
tate how the state’s judiciary will answer the
question whether a non-veterinarian tortfea-
sor who injures a pet is liable to reimburse the
pet owner for veterinary expenses reasonably
incurred to save (or attempt to) the life of the
animal when those expenses exceed the fair
market value or, if there is no market value,
the replacement value of the animal. Where
an item of inanimate personality has been tor-
tiously damaged, North Carolina measures
recoverable damages as “the difference
between its fair market value immediately
before and immediately after the injury.”21
Where the damaged item of inanimate per-
sonal property has no market value, the cost of
repair is the measure of damages.22
Other states with similar rules applied
where damaged personality is inanimate per-
mit recovery of veterinary expenses far in
excess of replacement value of an injured pet
that had no market value (for example,
because it was an older mixed-breed dog). In a
2011 California decision,23 after defendant
shot Plaintiff ’s cat, Plaintiff spent $36,000 to
save the cat’s life and treat it for paralysis.
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court’s
holding was that if the veterinary expenses
were reasonable the defendant was liable for
them. Suppose, however, the cat was a young
and attractive pure-bred Persian, and the trier
of fact was convinced it had market value of
$25. That such a finding should bar Plaintiff ’s
claim for recovery of all but $25 of the veteri-
nary bills is grossly unfair, yet the California
court stressed the absence of market value for
the cat in question. 
North Carolina should follow the lead of
New Jersey, which holds that a tortfeasor who
has injured a pet—whether negligently or
through willful misconduct—is liable for rea-
sonable veterinary costs incurred to save or
attempt to save the animal’s life even though
the animal had a market value far less than the
total of the bills for veterinary care. In 1998
New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court
affirmed a judgment awarding reimbursement
of the full amount of $2,500 in veterinary bills
paid to save the life of a tortiously injured pet
dog despite a finding that the dog’s replace-
ment value was $500, holding: “[A] house-
hold pet is not like other fungible or dispos-
able property, intended solely to be used and
replaced after it has outlived its usefulness.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently
approved this decision on the ground “that
pets are a special variety of personal proper-
ty.”25
Market or Replacement Value Should
Not Be a Cap on Intrinsic Value
Damages
New Jersey’s approach should also be
applied to cases where the pet owner seeks
damages based on intrinsic value of the tor-
tiously injured or killed pet and proves that
the pet had—before the injury—provided
special services but could no longer do so. For
example, in a 1980 case from New York, a
finding that a negligently killed pet dog had
no market value as a mixed breed entitled the
owner to recover $550 in damages on proof
that “plaintiff relied heavily on this well-
trained watchdog and never went out into the
streets alone at night without the dog’s protec-
tion.”26 The law should not let the negligent
defendant escape paying such damages by
convincing the trier of fact that because of its
training as a watchdog, the mutt had a market
value of $25. n
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state legal services, this is rarely the same as
what the client actually paid for the services.
Under most statutes, states employ a three
“factor” formula for apportioning the busi-
ness income earned by multistate actors,
including lawyers. Usually these formulas
take into account the taxpayer’s property, pay-
roll, and sales in each state, relative to the tax-
payer’s total property, payroll, and sales.
Different states apply different weights to
these factors. North Carolina weighs the sales
factor twice as heavily as either of the other
two factors. 
Since it is unlikely that a non-resident
attorney appearing pro hac vice in North
Carolina will own or rent any real or tangible
personal property in our state, the property
factor is likely to be zero. Similarly, since the
non-resident attorney typically will not pay
compensation in our state, the payroll factor
is likely to be zero.4
As a result, the sales factor is of greatest
concern to the non-resident attorney. The
sales factor represents the gross revenue
sourced to North Carolina, divided by the
gross revenue from all states. Especially in the
context of services revenue, the critical task is
determining to what state the revenue should
be sourced. Two main approaches have devel-
oped. 
First, in states that have adopted the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA), services revenue is
attributed to the state in which the greater
proportion of costs are incurred to perform
the activities that give rise to the income.
Second, in the 11 states which have adopted
a market-based sourcing rule, services revenue
is attributed to the state where the customer
or client receives the benefit. 
North Carolina employs a variation on
the UDITPA approach. Services income is
sourced to our state if the “income-producing
activities are in this state.”5 This rather
unhelpful rule is explained through guidance
issued by the NC Department of Revenue,
which provides that when services are per-
formed across state lines, gross receipts for
performing those services “shall be attributed
to this state based upon the ratio which the
time spent in performing such services in this
state bears to the total time spent in perform-
ing such services everywhere.” Consequently,
a non-resident lawyer who spends no time in
North Carolina will owe no North Carolina
tax, even if paid for appearing in a North
Carolina action.
Let’s take a practical example. A nonresi-
dent lawyer is admitted pro hac vice in North
Carolina. She has no real or tangible property
in our state and pays no “compensation”
within our state. The property and payroll
factors are therefore zero. She is paid
$150,000 for 500 hours of work on the case.
She spent 100 of those 500 hours in North
Carolina. The numerator of the sales factor is
therefore $150,000 x [100/500], or $30,000.
Assuming that her gross receipts from all
states during the year was $600,000, the sales
factor is $30,000 / $600,000, or 0.05.
To calculate the apportionment factor, all
of the factors must be combined, with the
sales factor weighted twice: [0 + 0 + 0.05 +
0.05] / 4 = 0.025. This apportionment factor
is then multiplied by her net business income
from all states to determine the income that
must be reported in North Carolina. Thus, if
her net business income for the year was
$320,000, the amount which must be report-
ed to North Carolina is $320,000 x 0.025, or
$8,000.
Fortunately, her home state will typically
give her a credit for any tax she paid to North
Carolina. She will in the end face a higher
total tax burden only if her North Carolina
tax bill is greater than her home state’s bill.
Obviously, if her home state has no income
tax, this burden can be significant.
A similar calculation results when a North
Carolina lawyer performs legal services in a
foreign state. But since the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Commerce Clause gives
the states considerable discretion when
adopting apportionment formulas, differ-
ences abound. South Carolina, for example,
adopts a single factor formula, under which
only sales sourced to the state are considered
in determining the tax. As a result of this
diversity, apportionment formulas could
overlap, resulting in double taxation of the
same income. When a firm’s employees are
physically present is another state, some
states may even require the payment of pay-
roll taxes.
Finally, if the non-resident attorney is a
partner, member, or shareholder of a partner-
ship, LLC, or S-corporation, must each part-
ner, member, or shareholder file a tax return
in North Carolina? Because the distributive
share of each owner of a pass-through entity
will include income apportioned to North
Carolina, the answer is generally yes.
Fortunately, North Carolina—along with
most other states—permits the partnership,
LLC, or S-corporation to file a “composite
return,” thereby paying the tax on behalf of
all of the firm’s owners. This will avoid the
administrative and compliance burdens asso-
ciated with filing and processing multiple
individual returns, often with little income to
report. n
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